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“ACTUAL” AND “CONSTRUCTIVE” 
POSSESSION IN ALASKA: 




In two cases, one recent and one now nearly a decade old, Judge David 
Mannheimer has raised important questions about Alaska’s jury instruction 
on “possession.”  In particular, Judge Mannheimer has expressed a worry that 
Alaska’s definition of “constructive possession” invites juries to find 
possession where the defendant is only near an object and has knowledge of its 
presence.  As Judge Mannheimer correctly points out, such a definition is too 
expansive.  But how can we avoid this problem? 
 
My short article takes Judge Mannheimer’s opinions in Alex v. State and 
Dirks v. State as the starting point for an investigation of Alaska’s possession 
doctrine.  After summarizing the two opinions in Part II, Part III attempts to 
clarify the seemingly straightforward idea of “actual possession,” and finds 
that many courts wrongly treat many cases of actual possession as cases of 
constructive possession.  Part IV tries to provide a solution to the problem—as 
presented by Judge Mannheimer—with Alaska’s instruction on constructive 
possession.  It offers that the key to constructive possession is not the idea that 
one intends to have control over an object, but that one has a legal right (or the 
functional equivalent of a legal right) over the object, or the space where the 
object is.  If we understand this idea of “authority” as essential to constructive 
possession, it turns out that pure cases of constructive possession are actually 
quite rare, and that many supposed cases of constructive possession are really 
cases of past actual possession.  Part V proposes a new jury instruction on 
actual and constructive possession. 
 
Copyright © 2019 by Chad Flanders. 
 *  Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Sean Oliveira, 
Stephen Galoob, Christopher Bradley, and Joe Welling for conversations and 
comments on a previous draft. I am also grateful to conversations with Sarah 
Park, Zachary Armfield, and Jason Gist, which helped with my thinking early on 
in this project. An early draft of this paper was written while the author was a 
visiting district attorney with the State of Alaska.  The views expressed in this 
article represent those of the author only. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following three cases, each ostensibly dealing with a 
case of criminal “possession”: 
 
After he is arrested outside of a nightclub, police search a man and 
find car keys on him. The keys lead to his girlfriend’s car, parked nearby. 
Inside the car the police find two guns, one under the front passenger seat, 
and another in the trunk. The girlfriend says — and the police believe her 
— that the guns were not in the car when she lent it to him. A fingerprint 
matching the man’s is found on one of the guns. The man, who has a prior 
felony conviction, is charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. 
On what theory of possession, actual or constructive, is the charge 




A man is found unconscious on his couch. In front of him on the 
coffee table is a small quantity of drugs, along with some drug 
paraphernalia. He is the owner of the apartment in which he is found and 
there is no evidence that anyone else lives there, or even that anyone has 
recently visited. No drugs are found on the man’s person, and the drugs 
and drug paraphernalia have no DNA or fingerprints that would tie them 
to the man. Does he possess the drugs, and if he does, is the possession 




A woman arranges the purchase of a large quantity of drugs. In 
exchange for money, she receives a key to a storage locker. The drugs are 
in the locker. She is arrested before she accesses the drugs in the storage 
locker. After the police open the locker and find the drugs, she is charged 
with possession with the intent to distribute. She argues that she never, in 
fact, has possessed the drugs, either under a theory of actual or 
constructive possession. Is she right that she never “possessed” the 
drugs?3 
 
 1.  The facts in this example are based on Ward v. State, No. A-10011, 2009 
WL 5154103, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2009). 
 2.  This example is loosely derived from the facts in Harrison v. State, 860 
P.2d 1280, 1282 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). 
 3.  This case is modeled on State v. Gasperino, 859 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1993), which involved a sting operation where the defendant paid in full for drugs 
but was never able to physically possess the marijuana because he was arrested. 
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*** 
Despite the high number of possession cases, and their importance,4 
what counts as sufficient for a conviction for “criminal possession” 
remains unclear.5 These cases, where possession can seem difficult to 
define are not bizarre cases, stretching our notion of what it means to 
possess something, but common, everyday cases like the hypotheticals 
above: cases where drugs or guns are not found on a person, but near a 
person, or on that person’s property. The difficulties are compounded 
when we introduce the purportedly helpful distinction between actual 
and constructive possession — two concepts that courts have not 
consistently applied. Courts have a tendency to group all possession that 
does not involve finding the relevant contraband on the person into the 
category of “constructive possession,” or even to treat actual and 
constructive possession as points on a continuum, as a matter of degree 
rather than of kind.6 
 
The court in Gasperino held that there was at least a jury question on the issue of 
whether Gasperino constructively possessed the drugs. See also Castillo v. State, 
821 P.2d 133 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (reversing the conviction of Castillo, who 
arranged for delivery of drugs but never physically possessed them, because the 
jury instructions were insufficient to produce a unanimous verdict). 
 4.  As Markus Dirk Dubber notes, “Possession offenses have not attracted 
much attention. Yet they are everywhere in modern American criminal law, on 
the books and in action. They fill our statute books, our arrest statistics, and, 
eventually, our prisons. By last count, New York law recognized no fewer than 
153 possession offenses; one in every five prison or jail sentences handed out by 
New York courts in 1998 was imposed for a possession offense. That same year, 
possession offenses accounted for over 100,000 arrests in New York State, while 
drug possession offenses alone resulted in over 1.2 million arrests nationwide.” 
Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal 
Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 834–35 (2001) (internal citations omitted). 
 5.  See Charles H. Whitebread & Ronald Stevens, Constructive Possession in 
Narcotics Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L. REV. 751, 751 (1972) 
(“[P]ossession . . . remains one of the most elusive and ambiguous of legal 
constructs.”). 
 6.  See, e.g., Nat’l Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914) (“[A]ctual 
and constructive possession . . . often so shade into one another that it is difficult 
to say where one ends and the other begins.”); United States v. Walker, 734 F.3d 
451, 456 (6th Cir. 2013) (“To be sure, the line of demarcation between ‘actual’ and 
‘constructive’ possession is not analytically crisp.”); Morgan v. State, 943 P.2d 
1208, 1211 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (suggesting that a law that makes it a crime for 
a felon to knowingly reside in a dwelling where there is a gun is merely an 
“extension” of the “traditional rule regarding a felon’s ‘constructive possession’ 
of a concealable firearm”). See also Morgan v. State, 943 P.2d at 1211 (“One 
plausible rationale for AS 11.61.200(a)(10) is the determination that a felon’s act of 
residing in a dwelling, knowing that a concealable firearm is kept there, should 
be criminal because it is sufficiently similar to constructive possession . . . .”). For 
reasons developed in Parts I and III, infra, I do not think this is correct. 
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In a pair of cases, one very recent7 and one now over a decade old,8 
Judge David Mannheimer of the Alaska Court of Appeals has suggested 
that Alaska’s instructions regarding possession need to be rethought, 
particularly when it comes to the distinction between “actual” and 
“constructive” possession. Part of Judge Mannheimer’s concern over the 
instructions stems from cases where juries are instructed as to both actual 
and constructive possession, when in fact only actual possession was at 
issue, risking juror confusion. But Judge Mannheimer’s deeper worry is 
that the definition of constructive possession given in the pattern 
instructions is simply mistaken, as it allows for a finding of constructive 
possession just when a person is near contraband and is aware that it is 
contraband. The current instruction, Judge Mannheimer warned in both 
of these cases, runs the risk that juries will find possession when in fact 
there is only proximity and knowledge, which may be necessary for 
possession in some cases, but not sufficient. 
This paper takes Judge Mannheimer’s two opinions as an invitation 
to try to clarify the law of possession in Alaska, and to suggest a helpful 
amendment to the current jury instructions regarding “possession.” Part 
I summarizes Judge Mannheimer’s two opinions, Dirks and Alex, and 
elaborates on what Judge Mannheimer sees as the difficulties with 
Alaska’s law of possession. In both opinions, Judge Mannheimer stops 
short of giving his own solution to the problem he finds in the current 
Alaska jury instructions, although he does give some recommendations. 
Parts III and IV work towards a solution. Part III attempts to clarify the 
seemingly straightforward idea of actual possession. Many cases where 
courts see “constructive possession” are in fact cases of “actual 
possession.” Courts confuse past actual possession with constructive 
possession as a result of construing “actual possession” too narrowly. In 
fact, many times, courts should instruct only on actual possession, as 
when a jury only needs to infer that at some point the defendant was in 
actual physical control of the contraband. Part IV outlines pure cases of 
constructive possession, which are quite rare: cases where a person never 
has the contraband on his or her person, but has a legal right, or 
something approximating a legal right, to the contraband or the place 
where the contraband is located. Although there can be cases where a jury 
should be instructed on both actual and constructive possession, they are 
still two distinct types of possession, not mere variations on one another, 
as is sometimes suggested. Part V offers concluding remarks, as well as a 
proposal for revised jury instructions on “possession.” 
 
 7.  Dirks v. State, 386 P.3d 1269 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017). 
 8.  Alex v. State, 127 P.3d 847 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
FLANDERS - V6.1 (FINAL VERSION) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2019  11:19 AM 
2019 “ACTUAL” AND “CONSTRUCTIVE” POSSESSION 5 
II. ALEX AND DIRKS 
In two cases, Alex and Dirks, Judge Mannheimer spends several 
pages questioning the basis of Alaska’s jury instructions on possession, 
especially as to how they articulate “constructive” possession. In both 
cases, the discussion is likely dicta, or at least Judge Mannheimer presents 
it as such. In Alex, Judge Mannheimer says that if there was possession in 
the case at all, it was actual, and not constructive.9 And in Dirks, Judge 
Mannheimer characterizes the state’s case as one of actual and not 
constructive possession.10 Both cases present Judge Mannheimer with an 
opportunity to show how the idea of constructive possession can be 
confusing, potentially misleading juries and lawyers. While Judge 
Mannheimer does not solve the problem of Alaska’s possibly erroneous 
instructions on possession by offering his own model instruction, he does 
point to some things to avoid. If there is to be something like “constructive 
possession,” Judge Mannheimer concludes, it cannot amount to only (a) 
having knowledge that the object is there, and (b) being near the object.11 
There has to be something more for the object to be constructively 
possessed. Although Judge Mannheimer does not specifically identify 
what that is, he presents two alternatives to consider: there has to be some 
right or authority over the object; or there has to be some intention to 
control the object.12 
Even though Judge Mannheimer says Alex and Dirks are actual 
possession cases, one can see from their facts how they could involve 
constructive possession. The facts in both cases are very similar. In Alex, 
during a traffic stop, an officer asked Alex and the driver, Leonard Torres, 
to step out of the vehicle.13 Apparently, Alex then told the officer that 
 
 9.  Id. at 848 (“It is not clear that this case even raises an issue of constructive 
possession . . . . It would therefore appear that, if Alex indeed possessed the pistol, 
he had actual possession of it, not ‘constructive’ possession.”). 
 10.  Dirks, 386 P.3d at 1270 (“For instance, even though the instruction makes 
a great point of distinguishing between ‘actual’ and ‘constructive’ possession, 
there was no evidence of constructive possession in Dirks’s case . . . . [T]he 
prosecutor never argued a theory of constructive possession.”). However, Judge 
Mannheimer earlier characterizes the state’s theory of possession as one in which 
Dirks possessed the weapon, because Dirks knew that the gun was “in the interior 
of a vehicle in which [he] was present.” Id. This certainly does not sound like 
“immediate physical possession,” and on appeal, the State did not characterize it 
as such. Id. 
 11.  Id. at 1271–72 (Arguing a person does not constructively possess 
something simply because someone else has brought “property to the defendant’s 
residence, vehicle, or place of business, and has placed the property within the 
defendant’s reach, and the defendant is aware that the property is there.”). 
 12.  Id. at 1271. 
 13.  Alex, 127 P.3d at 849. 
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there was a gun under the passenger seat of the vehicle.14 Because Alex 
was a convicted felon, he was prohibited from possessing a firearm, and 
was charged under Section 112.61.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes.15 Dirks 
was also a firearm case. This time, however, the gun was in the backseat 
of the car and Dirks was in the driver’s seat.16 Dirks was charged with 
possessing a firearm while impaired by alcohol.17 In both cases, the 
defendants argued that the gun belonged to someone else: Alex said that 
the gun was Earl Smith’s, who owned the vehicle,18 and the gun in the 
Dirks case belonged to Dirks’s passenger, Matthew Pemberton, and not 
Dirks.19 The appeals court affirmed Alex’s conviction, but reversed the 
conviction in Dirks. 
As noted above, Judge Mannheimer presents these cases as 
exclusively involving issues of actual possession, not constructive 
possession. This is not an obvious conclusion. For one, it is not obvious 
that these are cases of actual possession, if by that we mean “direct 
physical control.”20 Alex was riding in the passenger seat of a car where a 
gun was under his seat. It was not in his personal physical possession or 
“direct control,” unlike the beer can that was between his legs.21 The lack 
of “actual” possession seems even clearer in Dirks: the gun was in a 
holster and in the backseat.22 If actual possession is “physical possession,” 
then the fact that the guns were not in the hands or on the person (in the 
jacket or pants pocket, or in the sock) of Alex or Dirk would seem to show 
lack of actual possession. If there was a state theory of possession in these 
cases, it would have to be constructive possession. At the appellate level, 
the state’s theory of possession in the Dirks case was indeed one of 
constructive possession.23 The idea was that because Dirks was the owner 
or even the driver of the car Dirks had enough control over the gun, and 
the vehicle, to be in “constructive” possession of the gun. 
In any event, Judge Mannheimer took the objections to the language 
of the constructive possession instruction in both cases as opportunities 
to raise concerns about it. That instruction reads, in relevant part: 
 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Dirks, 386 P.3d at 1269. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Alex, 127 P.3d at 849. 
 19.  Dirks, 386 P.3d at 1270. 
 20.  As Alaska does, see the discussion infra Part III. 
 21.  Alex, 127 P.3d at 849. 
 22.  Dirks, 386 P.3d at 1269. 
 23.  Brief of Appellee at 12, Dirks v. State, 386 P.3d 1269 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017) 
(No. A-11534) (“The State Presented Sufficient Evidence of Constructive 
Possession.”). 
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The law recognizes two kinds of possession: actual possession 
and constructive possession. Actual possession means to have 
direct physical control, care, and management of a thing. 
 
A person not in actual possession may have constructive 
possession of a thing. Constructive possession means to have the 
power to exercise dominion or control over a thing. This may be 
done either directly or through another person or persons.24 
In Alex, Judge Mannheimer titles a section of his opinion, “Potential 
problems with the definition of ‘constructive possession.’”25 The main 
problem, as Judge Mannheimer sees it, derives from the phrase “have the 
power to.”26 He cites a Louisiana appeals court opinion that he thinks 
illustrates the problem.27 The case, State v. Harvey, involved a woman who 
was convicted of drug possession after drugs were found in her mother’s 
house where she was living.28 Although the evidence showed that the 
woman (Harvey) knew that the drugs were in the house and that drug 
dealing was going on in the house, the evidence didn’t show that Harvey 
herself exercised any “dominion and control” over the drugs.29 
This example illustrates, in Judge Mannheimer’s mind, the problem 
with defining constructive possession in terms of having power over 
something.30 In a purely descriptive sense, Harvey might have had power 
over the drugs, because she knew they were in the house and she had 
access to them.31 Harvey could have “exerted[ed] control over the drugs 
 
 24.  Alex, 127 P.3d at 850; see Definitions, ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(50) 
(2018) (“‘[P]ossess’ means having physical possession or the exercise of dominion 
or control over property.”). 
 25.  Alex, 127 P.3d at 850. 
 26.  Id. at 851 (“There is an ambiguity in the word ‘power.’”). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  463 So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 29.  Alex, 127 P.3d at 851 (citing Harvey v. State, 463 So. 2d at 708). Judge 
Mannheimer may mischaracterize Harvey here. It is not obvious that Harvey did 
know there were drugs in the house, or even lived in the house. See Harvey, 463 
So. 2d at 708 (“Carolyn Harvey was in the house when it was searched and the 
drugs were discovered. She may live there. There is no evidence, however, that 
she exercised dominion or control over the drugs.”); see also id. (indicating only 
that she “may have been aware” of the presence of drugs in the house). For a 
similar case which makes the point better than Harvey, see United States v. 
Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814, 818 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The evidence showed that she had access 
to or resided in the house and knew of the presence of the drugs, but did not show 
she had dominion and control [sic] them.”). 
 30.  See Dirks v. State, 386 P.3d 1269, 1271 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017) (“[T]he word 
‘power’ is ambiguous. It can refer to a person’s right or authority to exert control 
over people or property, but it can also refer to anything a person might be 
physically capable of doing if not impeded by countervailing force.”). 
 31.  Alex, 127 P.3d at 851. 
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if she had wished.”32 But this does not amount to having possession of 
those drugs, either actual or constructive. Judge Mannheimer adds his 
own example to further illustrate the point. If there is beer in the 
refrigerator of a house, and children know that the beer is in there, and it 
is within their physical power to get the beer, do the children have 
“constructive possession” of the beer?33 If power simply means ability, 
then it would seem that they are guilty of constructive possession (and 
therefore guilty of being minors in possession of alcohol). Judge 
Mannheimer concludes this is a problematic result because it means that 
“a person could be convicted of possessing contraband merely because 
the person knew of the contraband and had physical access to it.”34 
Interpreting “power” to mean “physical power,” creates issues where 
people can “constructively” possess things simply because they can reach 
out and grab them.35 
This discussion in Alex suggests that constructive possession should 
in some sense be a normative notion, so that in order to constructively 
possess something, one must not merely have the “power” to exercise 
control, but also in some sense have a legal right to it. The person who 
merely lives in a house where drugs are located may not own the drugs 
or indeed have any relationship to them, except knowing that they are 
there. The beers in the fridge that the children know about and are near 
to are similarly not theirs because they do not own them. The idea that 
there may need to be some extra element of “authority” or “right” over 
the item in question is one possibility Judge Mannheimer considers.36 
Judge Mannheimer also suggests that it may be enough to add an 
element of intent to exert control over an object.37 On this theory, one 
 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See United States v. Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir. 1994) (Coffin, J., 
dissenting) (“To the extent that the court jettisons all idea of legal right or practical 
claim to the contraband and assesses ‘power’ in terms of physical capacity to seize, 
it vastly widens the concept of constructive possession. Contraband stored in the 
locked box of a [sic] another person could be found within the power of a 
defendant skilled in the use of lock picking or explosives. Or, in a case like Wight, 
the finding as to constructive possession would turn on whether the driver was 
bigger and tougher than the passenger.”); see also State v. Barger, 247 P.3d 309, 315 
(Or. 2011), adhered to as modified on reconsideration, 253 P.3d 1030 (Or. 2011) (“It is 
clear from that decision that the mere fact that an object is within a person’s reach, 
and that the person thus has a physical ability to exercise some directing or 
restraining influence over it, is insufficient to establish constructive possession of 
the object.”). 
 36.  Alex, 127 P.3d at 851 (“[S]ome courts have worded their definitions of 
‘constructive possession’ in terms of a person’s ‘authority’ or ‘right’ to exert 
control over the item in question.”). 
 37.  Id. at 851. 
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might in fact possess drugs that are present in a house you are living in if 
you intend to exercise control over them; so too, apparently, might the 
children possess the beer if they intend to grab it. Judge Mannheimer does 
not choose either of these options, i.e., that constructive possession 
involves either a claim, right, or an intention to possess in the future.38 He 
simply argues that proximity and knowledge—even along with access—
are not enough for possession.39 
In Dirks, Judge Mannheimer largely continues in the same vein, 
arguing against certain concepts of constructive possession. He adds two 
other helpful examples, one negative and one positive. The negative 
example again demonstrates why knowledge and access are not enough. 
If possession were only knowledge and access, then a person walking 
down the aisle in a store would “possess” all of the store’s merchandise.40 
The positive example is less developed, but is intuitively plausible: when 
we are not home, Judge Mannheimer says, we still possess the belongings 
that are in our home, despite our lack of physical presence.41 This, 
presumably, is because we have the authority to exercise power and 
control over the items in our home, even though we are not actually 
exercising power and control. Judge Mannheimer makes a further 
observation that is also worth noting (it is something I will take issue with 
later in the paper42). Constructive possession, Judge Mannheimer says, 
relying on Black’s Legal Dictionary, is not true possession, but its “legal 
equivalent.”43 It is a legal fiction. We say that someone may 
“constructively know” something even though he does not — as when 
the law imputes knowledge to someone who has gone to great lengths to 
avoid knowing something.44 So too might someone possess something, 
albeit “constructively,” when he in fact does not possess it — as when a 
person possesses things that are not in his immediate physical possession. 
 
 38.  In Ward, however, the court implicitly endorses the authority view. See 
generally Ward v. State, No. A-10011, 2009 WL 5154103, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 
30, 2009). 
 39.  It follows that Judge Mannheimer rejects—rightly, in my view—the so-
called “proximity test,” where liability can be imposed “for being in an area where 
drugs are used or present.” See Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 764 
(describing the proximity test). 
 40.  Dirks v. State, 386 P.3d 1269, 1271 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017) (“Shoppers 
walking down the aisle of a store do not ‘possess’ all of the merchandise lying 
before them on the shelves, nor do museum visitors ‘possess’ all of the artwork 
they pass within reach of.”). 
 41.  Id. at 1270. 
 42.  See infra Part IV. 
 43.  Id. (“The law uses the adjective ‘constructive’ to refer to a situation where 
an action or a state of affairs does not actually fit within the normal definition of 
some relevant concept, but the action of state of affairs will nevertheless be treated 
as the legal equivalent.”). 
 44.  Id. 
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III. ACTUAL POSSESSION 
The conviction in Dirks was reversed because the appeals court 
found neither actual nor constructive possession.45 There was no actual 
possession because the gun was not in Dirks’s actual physical possession. 
Nor was there constructive possession, presumably because Dirks did not 
own the gun.46 Dirks was only near a gun and maybe knew of the gun, but 
as Judge Mannheimer emphasized in the closing sentence of the opinion, 
knowledge and proximity are not enough to find possession: 
A defendant may not be found guilty of ‘possessing’ an item of 
property that belongs to someone else merely because the owner 
of the property has brought the property to the defendant’s 
residence, vehicle, or place of business, and has placed the 
property within the defendant’s reach, and the defendant is 
aware that the property is there.47 
This may make the result in Alex appear confusing. In that case, 
Judge Mannheimer rejected the idea that an erroneous constructive 
possession instruction would matter, because Alex denied that he knew 
the gun was there, suggesting that he was not in actual, physical 
possession of the gun.48 But the jury also heard testimony that the gun 
didn’t belong to Alex, and that it instead belonged to Earl Smith, the 
owner of the car.49 Although Judge Mannheimer rightly surmises that the 
defense theory was that Alex did not actually possess the gun, it is 
possible that the jury could have concluded both that Alex wasn’t the 
owner of the gun and that he knew it was under the seat.50 This would 
raise the possibility that Alex was merely proximate to the gun and knew 
of its presence — mirroring the facts in Dirks, and seeming to warrant a 
 
 45.  Id. at 1270–71. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 1271–72. 
 48.  Alex v. State, 127 P.3d 847, 851 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (“Alex’s attorney 
denied that Alex knew about the pistol . . . .”). Recall, however, that the police 
officer testified that Alex told him there was a gun under the passenger seat, 
something Alex’s attorney had to suggest never happened. Id. at 849–50. 
 49.  Id. at 849. 
 50.  Judge Mannheimer in fact contemplates this possibility. See id. at 851 
(“[O]ne can imagine Alex conceding that he was aware of the pistol under his seat, 
but then asserting that he had no connection to the pistol and that he only became 
aware of its presence underneath his seat when, during his ride in the vehicle, the 
pistol bumped against his feet.”). The point in the text is that the jury might have 
guessed that this is what in fact happened, or something like it: Alex knew the 
gun was there, but still never touched the gun and did not own it. From this, they 
might have concluded that Alex neither actually nor constructively possessed the 
gun. 
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reversal of Alex’s conviction given the mistaken and potentially 
misleading jury instruction on constructive possession.51 
But there is another possibility, which explains why Judge 
Mannheimer viewed both Alex and Dirks as cases where the state had to 
prove actual possession. To see why, consider that actual possession is 
not the same as current actual possession. If a police officer is chasing 
someone, and the suspect drops a baggie of drugs as he flees, he can still 
be charged with possession of the drugs, even if the drugs are not found 
currently in the physical possession of the suspect. To put it more 
formally, actual possession can be shown either by the object being on the 
person or by circumstantial evidence that indicates that the object was 
recently in the physical possession of the person. Once we understand 
this, Alex becomes easier to see as a case of actual possession. The fact that 
the gun was under the passenger seat does not show that Alex had the 
gun in his current physical possession, but might support an inference 
that Alex had recently been in physical possession of the gun. Dirks, of 
course, properly emerges as the harder case: the gun is in the backseat 
and is registered to the passenger. The inference that Dirks at one time 
physically held the gun becomes more difficult to make. 
A case from Missouri demonstrates how “actual” possession has to 
include past and not just current possession.52 A search of an over-the-
counter drug registry revealed that Randy Twitty had made four 
purchases of pseudoephedrine in the last 38 days.53 Detectives went to 
Twitty’s house and observed him shredding several small boxes and 
putting them into his trash.54 Twitty later consented to a search of his 
house and the detectives found that the boxes were in fact empty pill 
boxes for pseudoephedrine.55 Their search also turned up two receipts for 
the purchases of the pseudoephedrine.56 In an interview, Twitty admitted 
to the officers that he had bought the drugs in order to give them to 
 
 51.  In other words, the defendant’s attorney may have been trying to 
anticipate that the jury might believe the police officer (i.e., that Alex had told the 
officer he knew the gun was there) and so wanted to rebut the notion that merely 
because Alex knew the gun was under the seat, he was in constructive possession 
of it. Judge Mannheimer also argues that because the jury found Alex guilty of 
being in possession of a weapon “in furtherance of a felony” this means that the 
jury had to have found Alex was more than merely aware of the gun under his 
seat. Id. at 852. It is of course possible that the juries first found possession—
whether actual or constructive—of a weapon and then concluded, given the 
presence of drugs, the two were somehow related. 
 52.  State v. Twitty, No. ED 102606, 2016 WL 2731943 (Mo. Ct. App. May 10, 
2016), transferred to Missouri Supreme Court, 506 S.W.3d 345 (Mo. 2017). 
 53.  Id. at *1. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
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someone in exchange for methamphetamine, knowing that the recipient 
would use the pseudoephedrine to make more methamphetamine.57 He 
was charged with possessing pseudoephedrine with the intent to process 
the chemical to create methamphetamine.58 
On appeal, Twitty argued that the state had never proved that he 
possessed the drug “because said controlled substance was not 
discovered at the time the police searched” Twitty’s apartment or when 
they arrested him.59 Amazingly, the Missouri Court of Appeals agreed 
with Twitty. They said that, despite Twitty admitting that he in fact 
possessed the controlled substance “just mere hours” before he was 
arrested, this was insufficient.60 This was not “actual possession” because 
the “unambiguous language” of Missouri’s statute defined actual 
possession as when a person has the substance “on his person or within 
easy reach and convenient control.”61 Nor was this a case of constructive 
possession, because holding that Twitty constructively possessed the 
drugs, the court went on, would “drastically broaden” the circumstances 
sufficient to find constructive possession.62 To find that Twitty 
constructively possessed the drugs, the court concluded, would be to 
create a “third category of possession,” where a defendant’s conviction 
“would be upheld for past actual possession under a theory of 
constructive possession.”63 
But the reasoning by the Missouri Court of Appeals misses the point 
that past actual possession is actual possession. We do not need to create 
an additional (third) category of possession, or even to appeal to 
“constructive possession,” to find that Twitty possessed the drugs.64 The 
fact that Twitty no longer had the drugs on him does not negate the fact 
that he very recently had the drugs on his person, or at least within his 
easy reach and convenient control. The Missouri Supreme Court later 
 
 57.  Id. at *2. 
 58.  Id. at *1. 
 59.  Id. at *2. 
 60.  Id. at *4. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  For a clear statement of the (mistaken) view that past possession is a kind 
of “constructive possession,” see State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 
1975) (“The purpose of the constructive-possession doctrine is to include within 
the possession statute those cases where the state cannot prove actual or physical 
possession at the time of arrest but where the inference is strong that the 
defendant at one time physically possessed the substance and did not abandon 
his possessory interest in the substance but rather continued to exercise dominion 
and control over it up to the time of the arrest.”); see also Whitebread & Stevens, 
supra note 5, at 755 (explaining that constructive possession is when there is an 
inference of possession “at one time”). 
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reversed the court of appeals, writing that “a reasonable inference drawn 
from these circumstances is that Twitty actually possessed 
pseudoephedrine on the date of the offense.”65 
A more subtle but related error is when courts correctly use various 
indicia of recent possession to show that a person has had actual 
possession, but then mistakenly call this “constructive” possession.66 
Courts in many of these cases seem to confuse indirect (or circumstantial) 
proof of actual possession with constructive possession, using 
“constructive possession” as shorthand for “very strong evidence that the 
defendant knew the contraband was there because he put it there and had 
access to it.”67 Courts will look to the fact that the drugs were found in a 
place where the defendant had exclusive access or that the drugs were 
near some of the defendant’s possessions or the defendant him- or 
herself.68 These elements are not always proof of constructive possession, 
but rather they provide facts from which a judge or jury could infer that 
the defendant had at some point actually possessed the drugs.69 
 
 65.  State v. Twitty, 506 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Mo. 2017). The court elaborated in a 
footnote: “If this Court adopted Twitty’s reasoning, evidence establishing that a 
police officer observed a defendant flush 40 pseudoephedrine pills down the toilet 
would be insufficient to prove actual possession because the officer did not seize 
the pills themselves. Criminal defendants could always avoid culpability even if 
the evidence overwhelmingly suggests possession of a controlled substance on 
the date of the offense. The General Assembly could not have intended such an 
absurd result.” Id. at 348 n.4. 
 66.  See Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 771 (“The state will often rely 
on circumstantial evidence to establish prior possession of the drug on 
defendant’s person.”). 
 67.  For a good example of such a case (in which constructive and not actual 
possession was found), see State v. Ludemann, 386 S.W.3d 882, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2012) (“Defendant was the sole tenant of the rock house, and he had the equivalent 
of a key; he had access and control over the safe’s contents because he had the 
combination that unlocked the safe. Wedgeworth told Officer Hilty that 
Defendant normally kept a copy of the combination on a slip of paper near the 
safe.”). 
 68.  For an example of such factors, under the guise of what is necessary for 
proof of constructive possession (rather than actual possession), see State v. Clark, 
490 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Mo. 2016); see also id. at 712 (discussing a case where 
defendant’s duffel bag, birth certificate, wallet, handgun, and personal hygiene 
items next to marijuana supported the inference that defendant controlled drugs); 
Wallace v. State, 932 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the fact that the 
“[a]ppellant himself was found in the described vehicle with the cocaine in close 
proximity” contributed to showing constructive possession); Dana L. Weinstein, 
Recent Decisions: The Maryland Court of Appeals, 57 MD. L. REV. 795, 801 (1998) 
(describing Maryland’s “four factor test” to determine constructive possession, 
where factors include proximity to drugs and evidence that the defendant was 
participating in the “enjoyment” of the contraband). 
 69.  For an excellent example of how circumstantial evidence can strongly 
support an inference of past actual possession, see Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025 
(Alaska 1972), rev’d, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). The court in Davis noted that “[t]here is 
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Ownership is another relevant fact, although lack of ownership would not 
be enough to defeat an inference of actual possession, e.g., I can have 
something in my hand that I do not own. Proximity to the object is another 
fact that can be used to infer past actual possession. Alex is probably best 
seen as a case of actual possession based on proximity and knowledge, 
although the inference of possession is not incredibly strong (i.e., “I knew 
the gun was there, but it wasn’t mine, and I never touched it.”).  If this 
characterization is correct, then Judge Mannheimer’s conclusion in that 
case—that the constructive possession instruction was irrelevant to the 
resolution of the case—seems on surer footing. 
With these points in mind, we can return to the first two examples 
raised in Section I. The case of the two guns in the car turns out to be a 
fairly straightforward case of past actual possession — and thus “actual 
possession” — at least for one of the guns.70 The fingerprint suggests that 
the gun was physically held at one point and the girlfriend’s testimony 
points to the boyfriend physically putting the other gun into the car.71 The 
second example, where a man is found slumped and unconscious near a 
lot of drugs and drug paraphernalia is a little harder but strongly points 
to past actual possession (how else did the drugs get there?). What is 
important to note is that what courts are trying to determine is not 
whether the drugs are somehow “constructively” possessed because they 
are near the individual. What courts are doing in most of these cases is 
trying to figure out whether, in the words of the Alaska instruction, the 
person had direct physical control of the drugs at some point. It is no 
contradiction to say that direct physical control can be proved indirectly 
by making inferences from available facts.72 Indeed, that is likely what is 
being asked of the jury in nearly all possession cases. Understood 
correctly, true constructive possession accounts for only a very small 
number of possession cases. 
 
no direct evidence that Davis was at any time in possession of the safe.” 
Nevertheless, it concluded that “[t]he evidence of possession of the safe in the 
instant case, though circumstantial, is comparable in persuasiveness to any direct 
evidence short of the defendant being caught with the safe in hand.” Id. at 1034. 
 70.  See Ward v. State, No. A-10011, 2009 WL 5154103, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Dec. 30, 2009) (“[T]he State’s evidence was that Ward had actual possession of the 
firearms.”). 
 71.  Id. at *5–6 (in the actual case, there was DNA on one of the guns, not a 
fingerprint). 
 72.  See United States v. Walker, 734 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2013) (collecting 
cases in which “actual possession can be shown when there is no direct evidence 
of possession”). 
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IV. CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION 
If most possession cases involve actual possession — either because 
the person is in physical control or because there is a reasonable inference 
that the person had physical control at one time — then what constitutes 
constructive possession? 
Here, we turn to the third example from Section I, which is a true 
case of  constructive possession. A person may have something akin to a 
legal right to the item itself or have a right to access the place where the 
item is stored. That will amount to possession of the item, even if the 
person has never touched the item in the past or may never be able to 
touch it in the future, e.g., because he is apprehended before he can access 
the item. Such possession in this case is “constructive,” in the sense that 
we are imputing possession in the absence of any physical contact with 
the item. 
When we look at constructive possession this way, we have 
something genuinely distinct from either present physical possession or 
past physical possession, so it would be wrong to view constructive 
possession as on a continuum with actual possession, as if the two 
concepts might shade into one another.73 Constructive possession is a 
distinct kind of possession. It points, at best, to something more like future 
actual possession, although it is not necessary that constructive 
possession in fact ever ripen into actual possession.74 A person who has 
paid someone to mail him drugs may have constructive possession of the 
drugs when they arrive in his mailbox, even if he hasn’t touched the 
package yet.75 
In this manner, constructive possession can mean having a sort of 
right or authority over the objects,76 rather than physical power over them. 
Legal ownership of the object is certainly one way of establishing 
constructive possession, but it is not the only way. It cannot be, moreover, 
that only established legal rights create constructive possession. Many 
 
 73.  See Alex v. State, 127 P.3d 847, 848 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (noting that 
constructive possession as a concept “suffers from lack of precision” and 
attributing that, in part, to the fact that actual and constructive possession may 
“shade into” one another). 
 74.  See State v. Gasperino, 859 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“There is 
no requirement for constructive possession that a person have had actual 
possession or absolute certainty that constructive possession will ripen into actual 
possession.”). 
 75.  For a recent case with these facts, see State v. Shigemura, 552 S.W.3d 734, 
741 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (finding constructive possession of drugs that “were in 
an unopened package, delivered that day, to an outside mailbox”). 
 76.  In this, I side with what Whitebread and Stevens call the “proprietary 
interest test,” although I am not sure I agree with all of the ways in which they 
apply it. See Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 763. 
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times, people may have no legal right in the object or in the place where 
the object is stored. Suppose I pay someone for a gun, and he puts it in 
“my” car (a car that I have recently stolen) to retrieve later. Suppose 
further that the gun I plan to retrieve is stolen as well. Here, I have no 
legal right in the place where the item is found (the car is stolen) nor in 
the gun that I have purchased (the gun is stolen). Still, it makes sense to 
say in this case, by paying for the gun and by virtue of the fact that the 
gun is deposited in the car I currently possess, that I have authority over 
the gun—i.e., people would recognize that the gun is “mine” in a 
conventional, if not a legal, sense. This would be enough, in my view, to 
establish constructive possession. I do not have a legal right to the gun in 
my example, or to the place (the stolen car) where I am able to access the 
gun—both are legally someone else’s property—but I do have a sort of 
authority over the gun: I have bought it, and I have privileged access to 
the gun.77 A focus on my “authority” over the object moves us towards a 
more normative conceptualization of constructive possession.78 
We can see why focusing on authority is important by recognizing 
an issue with Judge Mannheimer’s other option for unpacking 
constructive authority: the idea that one may have the intention to exercise 
control over the object.79 On this view, I do not need any sort of legal or 
moral right over something to intend to exercise control over it, where 
“intent” is meant descriptively. But this has absurd results similar to 
making constructive possession only a matter of knowledge and 
proximity. I do not “possess” the items in a supermarket when I walk 
down the aisle merely because I know the items are there and I am near 
them. Does adding the fact that I intend to take them without paying for 
them make it the case that I possess them? In other words, am I now in 
“constructive possession” of a can of soup on the shelf that I am close to, 
 
 77.  Judge Posner explained a version of this point well: “[The defendant] 
need not have them literally in his hands or on premises that he occupies but he 
must have the right (not the legal right, but the recognized authority in his criminal 
milieu) to possess them.” United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 
1986) (emphasis added). The larger point here may be that the idea of 
“constructive possession” relies on social meanings about “authority” or what it 
is to “own” or “control” a thing. 
 78.  See United States v. Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (Coffin, J., 
dissenting) (“More importantly, in this and other circuits, the case law supports a 
reading of ‘power’ as the right or authority to exercise control, or dominion and 
control, over something not in one’s actual possession.”). 
 79.  See Alex, 127 P.3d at 851 (“Other courts have worded the test as the 
defendant’s ‘power and intention’ to exert control or dominion over the object”); 
see also id. at 848 (“There is, in fact, some case law to support Alex’s contention 
that a person should not be convicted of constructively possessing an object 
merely because the person could have exercised dominion or control over the 
object—that the government must also prove either that the person did exercise 
dominion or control over the object, or at least intended to do so.”). 
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that I know is there, and that I mean to steal shortly? For that matter, am I 
in constructive possession of the drugs in a house if I am present in the 
house, know the drugs are there, and intend to take control over them? 
Surely not. In this case, we would have to wait until I actually possessed 
the can of soup or the drugs before we have a case of possession (in this 
case, actual possession). Anything less than this would amount to 
punishing me for my thoughts. By contrast, if I was in the house and I 
knew there were drugs there and I had paid for the drugs, I think we have 
a clear case of constructive possession, even before I lay hands on the 
drugs. And this shows why the third example from Section I is a clear case 
of constructive possession, where I have authority over the drugs—I paid 
for them—even though I have not yet (and in fact may never) come into 
actual possession of them.80 
There is a further wrinkle with the idea of constructive possession 
and it involves another one of Judge Mannheimer’s hypotheticals. Judge 
Mannheimer says that I “constructively” possess all the items in my 
house. But suppose someone comes into my house with a gun in his jacket 
pocket. Do I now constructively possess that gun? The answer is “no” 
because the person with the gun in his pocket retains (actual) possession 
of it. Things change if the person leaves his jacket in my house, and then 
informs me that the gun is in the jacket in my house. Now, I am in a 
position where I have dominion and control over the gun, and so I could 
be said to constructively possess it, even if I have never held it in my 
hands. Does it follow that I am in real trouble if I am a felon who is not 
allowed to possess guns? Maybe. Two things need to be noted. First, I can 
only be said to possess the gun if there was sufficient time for me to get 
rid of the gun after I was made aware of its existence. This goes to the 
more basic requirement that in order to voluntarily possess something, I 
must be aware of that possession for a “sufficient period to have been able 
to terminate it.”81 Secondly, and somewhat relatedly, Alaska allows that I 
can briefly possess the gun so that I may dispose of it.82 In other words, I 
 
 80.  Is intention to at some point actually possess nonetheless a necessary 
condition of constructive possession? It may not be. Suppose I buy some drugs 
and my supplier places them in a storage locker for me. I have no intention of 
actually, i.e., physically, possessing them myself; I only intend to store them until 
I can sell them. I think it is clear that I constructively possess the drugs in the 
storage locker, even absent an intention to ever take control of the drugs myself. 
 81.  ALASKA STAT. 11.81.900(b)(66) (2018); see also Pulusila v. State, 425 P.3d 
175, 182 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018) (“Under Alaska’s criminal law, to prove that a 
person ‘possessed’ an item, the government must prove that the person engaged 
in a voluntary act of possessing or controlling the item. AS 11.81.600(a). In this 
context, a ‘voluntary’ act of possession means physical possession or control 
where the person ‘was aware of the physical possession or control for a sufficient 
period to have been able to terminate it.’ AS 11.81.900(b)(66).”). 
 82.  Jordan v. State, 819 P.2d 39, 40 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (“[M]omentary or 
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only constructively possess the gun that someone has left in my house if 
I do not act to get rid of it within a reasonable amount of time.83 
Of course, there will be cases where a jury should be instructed as to 
both actual and constructive possession. These cases may be quite 
common, even if cases of only constructive possession will be quite rare. 
For example, a gun is found in the bedroom of a defendant, which only 
he has access to.84 Is this a case of actual or constructive possession? On 
the one hand, the jury may be asked to make an inference from the facts 
that the defendant has at one point had physical control over the gun and 
even that he put the gun in the bedroom. On the other hand, the jury may 
be asked to consider the defendant’s authority over the room, especially 
given his exclusive access. Although this seems more likely to be a case of 
past actual possession, the prosecution would be within its rights to ask 
for an instruction on constructive possession as well.85 And here we can 
return to the other two examples from Section I. The case of someone 
found in his apartment, unconscious, and near drugs and drug 
paraphernalia looks like a case of actual possession. But supposing only 
the defendant had access to and authority over the apartment, perhaps a 
jury could find constructive possession as well.86 By contrast, the example 
 
passing control of drugs for purposes of disposal does not amount to unlawful 
possession.”). 
 83.  See also Brief of Appellee at 12, Dirks v. State, 386 P.3d 1269 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2017) (No. A-11534), 2014 WL 7715453(finding constructive possession in a 
case where “a homeowner who allows his neighbor to keep beer in the 
homeowner’s refrigerator, thereby possessing [sic] the neighbor’s beer.”). Dirks, 
however, is more like a case where a neighbor is in the home, holding the beer. In 
this case, the homeowner does not constructively possesses that beer. But it is still 
the case that I could have constructive possession of a gun that you actually 
possess (i.e., have in your hand), if for example, I am the owner of the gun or 
otherwise have the authority to control what happens to the gun. See, e.g., 
Simmons v. State, 899 P.2d 931, 936–37 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (“In arguing the 
state’s case to the jury, the prosecutor specifically maintained that, even though at 
times Herrera may have had actual possession of the gun, the gun had always 
remained in Simmons’s constructive possession.”). 
 84.  See Woods v. State, No. A-1128, 1986 WL 1161007 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 
30, 1986) (guns found in defendant’s bedroom upheld on a theory of constructive 
possession). 
 85.  In Nelson v. State, stolen goods were found in a crawlspace to which only 
Herring (one of the defendants) had a key. 628 P.2d 884, 889–90 (Alaska 1981). A 
fingerprint of Herring’s was also found on another item in the crawlspace. Id. 
Here, a jury might find either past actual possession of the goods or constructive 
possession in Herring’s ability to exercise dominion over the goods. Instructions 
on both actual and constructive possession will be warranted when there is 
evidence of a person’s authority over an area as well as evidence that allows an 
inference to past actual possession. 
 86.  Also relevant to this case is that he was the only person who seemed to 
have access to the apartment—”exclusivity” is a good indicator of dominion and 
control. 
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of the two guns in the girlfriend’s car looks to be only a case of actual 
possession, given the lack of ownership and authority over the car.87 
Even though there may be cases where a jury should receive 
instructions in both actual and constructive possession, constructive 
possession remains a distinct kind of possession. It is not a mere variation 
on actual possession, as if possession becomes constructive when the 
object is close to you, but not actually on you. That would be to see 
constructive possession as a sort of fictional kind of actual possession,88 
“figurative actual possession,” as one court put it,89 and as somehow a 
point on an arbitrary line between non-possession and physical 
possession.90 It is, rather, a kind of legal possession, or “possession as a 
matter of law.”91 Understood in this way, however, constructive 
possession will not always require having a legal right in something or a 
right in the place where it is held. There can be the functional equivalent 
of such a right, which one Alaska court put as having “capacity and 
authority to control the property.”92 This is why one may have 
constructive possession of a stolen gun in a stolen car, provided that one 
has the ability to control that gun, or to control what is in that car. 
Constructive possession exists so long as there is the ability and the power 
to exercise the type of control that would usually flow from having a legal 
right.93 In a case of sole constructive possession the relevant question 
 
 87.  And for related reasons, Dirks is a case of neither actual nor constructive 
possession. 
 88.  See, e.g., Michael S. Deal, Case Note, United States v. Walker: Constructive 
Possession of Controlled Substances: Pushing the Limits of Exclusive Control, 2 J. 
PHARMACY & L. 401, 401 (1993) (“Constructive possession is a legal fiction created 
by courts to find possession where it does not exist in fact.”). 
 89.  State v. Gasperino, 859 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
 90.  Contra George H. Singer, Constructive Possession of Controlled Substances: A 
North Dakota Look at a Nationwide Problem, 68 N.D. L. REV. 981, 983 (1992) 
(“Drawing a distinct line between actual and constructive possession is difficult 
because the terms so embody one another that it is nearly impossible to pinpoint 
where one begins and the other ends.”); see also David Caudill, Probability Theory 
and Constructive Possession of Narcotics: On Finding that Winning Combination, 17 
HOUS. L. REV. 541, 546 (1980) (constructive possession is “the gray zone between 
actual physical possession and proximity to [an object]”). 
 91.  Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 5, at 761–62 (constructive possession is 
used when courts “want an individual to acquire the legal status of a possessor”). 
Whitebread and Stevens, however, insist on calling this a sort of “fictional 
possession.” Id. at 761. Constructive possession, however, is a different kind of 
possession, but it is still legal possession. 
 92.  Thompson v. State, No. A-6666, 1998 WL 652176, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Sept. 23, 1998). 
 93.  See United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1441 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding 
constructive possession of drugs transported by a third party because the 
agreement defendant had with the third party made it “reasonable to infer [that 
the defendant] had the ability to guide the destination of the cocaine”). 
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might be something like: if I wanted to, would I be able to easily gain 
control of this item?94 Or to put it another way, am I in the sort of 
relationship to the item where I have a kind of privilege or entitlement to 
it, so that I can straightforwardly “reduce [that] object to [my] control”?95 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current Alaska instruction on possession is problematic, if only 
because of the ambiguity of “power” and perhaps “direct control.” Courts 
must be careful to read actual possession as meaning “direct control,” 
including past physical possession, which may be proven by inferences 
from circumstantial evidence. Cases of past physical possession are cases 
of actual possession, not of constructive possession. The instruction on 
constructive possession is, too, subject to ambiguities of interpretation. If 
courts read “power” in “power to exercise dominion or control” as simply 
the ability to exercise control, then the instruction makes everything that 
we know about and are near to potentially within our “possession,” so 
long as we have the ability to possess it.96 Nor is this issue solved by 
requiring that we have the intention to possess the thing. This solution, 
again, sweeps too broadly and makes anything that we are near and want 
to possess somehow “in our possession.” These are the dangers that Judge 
Mannheimer was rightly concerned about. 
This is why the paradigm case of constructive possession is having a 
legal right to something. If I legally own something, I possess it, even 
before I ever physically lay hold of it (and indeed, even if I never do). 
Exercising dominion comes close to this idea, but the phrasing is archaic, 
and liable to mislead or confuse jurors, but the idea behind it is essential.97 
 
 94.  See United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1961) (“Moreover, 
a person who is sufficiently associated with the persons having physical custody 
so that he is able, without difficulty, to cause the drug to be produced for a customer 
can also be found by a jury to have dominion and control over the drug, and 
therefore possession.”) (emphasis added). 
 95.  1 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1(e) (3d ed. 2017) 
(“It is not uncommon, however, for constructive possession to be even more 
broadly defined to include as well circumstances in which the defendant had the 
ability to reduce an object to his control.”); see also Singer, supra note 90) (“It is not 
uncommon for constructive possession to be judicially interpreted even more 
broadly to include a right, a capacity, or an ability to reduce the substance to one’s 
control.”). 
 96.  See Alex v. State, 127 P.3d 847, 851 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). (“[Power] can 
also refer to anything a person might be physically capable of doing if not 
impeded by countervailing force.”). 
 97.  See United States v. Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (Coffin, J., 
dissenting) (“I am persuaded that this reliance on physical power of access 
understates the law’s requirements. Although, as the court points out, a lay 
person’s understanding of ‘possession’ is not helpful, I cannot so easily sidestep 
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In addition, there may be cases of constructive possession without a legal 
right—I may have a sort of exclusive control over property or over a place 
where the property is, and this may suffice for constructive possession.98 
The exact way to word constructive possession is thus elusive. We 
may want to use “power,” but even this has to be qualified, in such a way 
that having the power means the ability to maintain control and to reduce 
it to one’s possession. That is, we need to phrase “power over” something 
to be as close as possible to — and deliberately suggestive of — a legal 
right in an item, or a place where the item is, which “authority” comes 
closest to capturing. My suggestion, then, for a revised jury instruction 
would be something like the following: 
The law recognizes two kinds of possession: actual possession 
and constructive possession. Actual possession means to have 
direct physical control, care, or management of a thing. Actual 
possession does not have to be current possession; it is enough 
for actual possession to show that the defendant recently had 
physical control, care, or management over the item. 
 
A person not in actual possession may have constructive 
possession of an item. Constructive possession means to have 
ownership of an item, or power and authority over that item or 
over a place where that item is such that one can without 
difficulty or opposition reduce it to one’s direct physical 
control.99 
What these instructions attempt to do is to remove the ambiguities from 
the current instruction that might lead juries to interpret “possession” 
either more narrowly or more broadly than the law intends. Actual 
possession need not only be present; it can also be past. Constructive 
possession does not merely mean having the power to potentially 
physically possess an item, but neither does it only mean having a legal 
right to a thing. Undoubtedly, improvements to these instructions on 
possession can be made, but if courts and litigators are to take Dirks and 
 
our and other courts’ use of the word ‘dominion,’ which connotes ownership or a 
right to property.”). 
 98.  See United States v. King, 632 F.3d 646, 651 (10th Cir. 2011) (“This 
inference of knowing dominion over or control of a firearm is appropriate where 
the defendant has exclusive possession over the premises.”). 
 99.  See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 20–21, Ward v. State, (No. A-10011), 2008 
WL 6588976 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2008) (The trial court’s instruction on 
constructive possession stated that “constructive possession means to have the 
power and authority to exercise control over an item.”). The Alaska Court of 
Appeals approved of this language in Ward v. State, No. A-10011, 2009 WL 
5154103, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2009) (“The instruction which the trial 
court gave was similar to the instruction we suggested in Alex v. State.”). 
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Alex seriously, then it is desirable that some changes be made. Here I have 
only tried to flesh out Judge Mannheimer’s worries, add some of my own, 
and to suggest a way forward in addressing them. 
